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Introduction 
 
 
The Trouble with Transition 
No Off-the-Shelf Arrangement for the UK after Brexit 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
The transition will be the most important medium-term issue in the second phase of 
the Brexit negotiations. The United Kingdom is due to leave the European Union offi-
cially in March 2019, too soon to negotiate a detailed agreement on future relations. 
With neither side standing to gain from a cliff-edge, the British request for a transitional 
arrangement falls on open ears. But finding agreement will be no easy matter. From 
the EU’s perspective the only acceptable option is full and complete replication of the 
status quo, with the UK accepting and implementing EU rules for two years without 
having any say over them. This will include Prime Minister Theresa May needing to 
secure a parliamentary majority accepting “rule-taker” status for the UK – and breaking 
all the promises of the advocates of Brexit for at least two years. 
 
The clock is ticking for London. After trig-
gering Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union on 29 March 2017, the UK is due to 
leave the EU exactly two years later. Before 
the UK becomes a third state on 29 March 
2019, Prime Minister Theresa May hopes 
to negotiate a comprehensive “Deep and 
Special Partnership” with the EU, with the 
UK outside the single market and the cus-
toms union. 
Currently, however, the two sides are 
miles apart: talks on such an agreement are 
only just about to begin. The EU-27 made 
negotiations on the shape of the future rela-
tionship conditional on “sufficient progress” 
first being achieved on the divorce settle-
ment – on London’s outstanding financial 
obligations to the EU, the rights of EU citi-
zens and the Irish border question. This was 
already a difficult process. May is politically 
weakened after losing her majority in early 
elections she called herself in June 2017; her 
cabinet is divided and she depends on North-
ern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party for 
her parliamentary majority. This left her un-
able to conclude the first phase of negotia-
tions with the EU-27 as hoped in October 
2017. 
After tough negotiations, especially on 
the Irish question, May made significant 
concessions in all three areas; in December 
2017 the EU negotiators were finally satis-
fied that sufficient progress had been made. 
Now the truly difficult questions about the 
future relationship must be tackled (see 
SWP Comment 49/2016). The European 
Council is now preparing to define the EU-
27’s guidelines for future relations in trade 
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and other matters such as foreign policy, 
security, defence, and the fight against 
terrorism at its next meeting in March 
2018. Experience to date – with wide-
reaching free trade talks in general and 
with the Brexit negotiations specifically – 
suggest agreement on anything more than 
a general framework will be virtually im-
possible to achieve before “Brexit day” at 
the end of March 2019. 
Three Concepts for the Transition 
The rigidity of the timeframe magnifies the 
urgency of finding a transitional arrange-
ment. May first explicitly floated the idea 
in her Florence speech in September 2017. 
There are, however, three distinctly dif-
ferent concepts concerning how the tran-
sition should be defined and what goals it 
should pursue. British businesses want to 
be able to plan for the period after March 
2019, without fear of a “disorderly Brexit” 
causing great economic disruption. Espe-
cially in the financial sector, they therefore 
want to see trade arrangements for the peri-
od after 30 March 2019 clarified by spring 
2018 at the latest, with full participation 
in the single market and the customs union 
guaranteed for as long as possible after Bre-
xit. Otherwise, they argue, businesses will 
have to prepare for a disorderly Brexit and 
activate contingency plans. 
Prime Minister May, on the other hand, 
speaks of an “implementation phase”. She 
sees this being agreed at the same time as 
the future relationship – whereby the tran-
sition would ease the way into the new 
relationship. May’s implementation phase 
would thus gradually transition the UK into 
its new role as a third state with a “Deep 
and Special Partnership”. This also implies 
that parts of the EU’s acquis would succes-
sively cease to apply in the UK as the pro-
cess rolled out. This would be comparable 
to reversing the transitional arrangements 
for new EU member states, for which some 
parts of the EU acquis (like full freedom of 
movement of persons) only came into force 
step by step after they joined the Union. 
The Interests of the EU-27 
The EU-27 has its own ideas. It is willing in 
principle to agree a transition phase. In its 
guidelines for the Brexit negotiations, the 
European Council stipulates that transitional 
arrangements may be made “to the extent 
necessary and legally possible”. 
Crucially, however, the European Com-
mission regards a transitional phase prin-
cipally as a means to gain more time for the 
complex negotiations on the future rela-
tionship. In this view the withdrawal agree-
ment will only define the general political 
principles for the future relationship. But 
full trade negotiations will only be con-
cluded during the post-Brexit transition, 
after the UK has become a third country. 
The Union’s stance for this “standstill” 
transition is predicated on preserving the 
integrity of the single market, without 
exceptions, in pursuit of three objectives: 
Firstly, a transition phase only makes 
sense for the EU-27 if the UK accepts the 
EU’s entire acquis for the whole period and 
participates fully in all the Union’s policies. 
Permitting London to cherry-pick the most 
advantageous aspects of the acquis would 
undermine the single market and weaken 
the EU’s position in negotiations over the 
future relationship. Secondly, the EU-27 has 
its own interest in seeing the UK leave the 
EU’s political institutions in March 2019: 
as a third state it will no longer participate 
in the Union’s decision-making processes, 
nor stage elections to the European Parlia-
ment in May 2019. Thirdly, a transitional 
arrangement would allow one of the most 
difficult Brexit issues – the problem of the 
border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland – to be deferred. Not-
withstanding the UK’s commitment to 
“regulatory alignment” with the EU’s single 
market and customs union in the areas 
necessary to keep the border open as part 
of the political agreement on “sufficient 
progress”, the challenges involved in actu-
ally realising this are far from solved. From 
the EU’s perspective any transition arrange-
ment must therefore guarantee that the 
status quo is preserved, by keeping the UK 
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fully in the single market and customs 
union. 
The Devil in the Details 
In principle the UK government, British 
businesses and the EU-27 would all like to 
see a transitional phase. Where they differ 
is in what shape and for how long the ar-
rangement should apply. The EU in particu-
lar will insist on a comprehensive agree-
ment with a “status quo transition”, and 
refuse gradual implementation. 
But there are also legal and political 
obstacles to a “status quo” arrangement. 
Legally speaking, the UK cannot maintain 
its status quo, given that the very essence of 
Brexit is that the UK’s status changes from 
EU member state to third state. So the two 
sides will need to agree the conditions and 
timeframe for maintaining the substance 
of the UK’s EU membership, in particular 
participation in the single market and the 
customs union. 
So a mere political agreement to pre-
serve the status quo will not be enough, 
especially given the recent discussions in 
the UK questioning the seriousness of the 
political commitments that ended phase 
one of the Brexit negotiations. Instead a 
format will need to be found for a tran-
sition regime that keeps the UK within the 
EU’s legal order. Legally speaking, transi-
tion rules can be adopted as part of the 
withdrawal agreement under Article 50 
as long as they are clearly limited in time. 
But politically this would require London 
to submit to European law – over which it 
no longer has any say – for the duration of 
the transition period. The more closely the 
requirements are examined, the more seri-
ous the doubts about the political feasibil-
ity of transition. 
Preserving the EU’s Legal Order 
If the UK is to preserve the status quo dur-
ing the transition it will need above all to 
promise to remain within the EU’s legal 
framework. The Union and its single mar-
ket represent in the first place a shared 
legal order. On the other hand, under Ar-
ticle 50 (3) the EU treaties cease to apply 
in the departing state on the day the with-
drawal agreement comes into effect. For 
that very reason, London is transposing the 
entire EU acquis into British law with effect 
from Brexit day, through the so-called With-
drawal Bill. At first glance that would 
appear to ensure ongoing convergence be-
tween EU law and British law. At the same 
time, however, the Withdrawal Bill revokes 
the European Communities Act of 1972, 
which is the central legal foundation of the 
UK’s membership and the conduit connect-
ing British and European law. 
Even if the Withdrawal Bill passes both 
houses of the British parliament and the 
country adopts European law in full, four 
legal – and thus political – challenges 
remain: 
Firstly, the vision of the UK as a fully 
sovereign country whose laws are – as de-
manded by Theresa May – made only in 
Westminster and the UK’s devolved parlia-
ments and overseen only by British courts is 
fundamentally incompatible with remain-
ing within the EU’s legal order. One of the 
Brexiteers’ central arguments has been to 
restore national parliamentary sovereignty 
(“take back control”). This is incompatible 
with one of the fundamental principles of 
European law as established by rulings of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ): in any 
conflict between national and European law, 
European law takes precedence. The With-
drawal Bill annuls that principle with effect 
from the date of departure, permitting the 
British parliament and government to devi-
ate from EU law. In legal terms, this is the 
very essence of Brexit. Yet a status quo tran-
sition would require London to guarantee 
ongoing primacy of EU law equivalent to 
the existing European Communities Act, by 
accepting the rulings of the ECJ as binding. 
Otherwise, for example, London would be 
able to undermine the single market by 
adopting lower standards than the EU’s. 
Secondly the UK would have to promise 
to transpose all new EU legislation. Most EU 
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legislation is based on directives, which 
member states are required to transpose in 
their national legislation within a defined 
period. As long as the UK retains full access 
to the single market during the transition 
it will have to promise to transpose all new 
directives in British law – without having 
any say in their drafting. To date this has 
been guaranteed by the UK’s European Com-
munities Act, which also obliges the Scot-
tish, Welsh and Northern Irish regional 
governments to transpose EU directives in 
matters falling within their powers. In pub-
lic statements London has shown itself 
open to a solution, arguing that legal acts 
requiring transposition during a two-year 
transition would largely be those in whose 
creation the UK government had already 
participated. Political conflicts are, how-
ever, easily imaginable over EU directives in 
areas where the UK often disagrees with the 
rest of the EU, such as financial regulation. 
Thirdly, EU law also has direct effect in 
the member states. In the UK to date this 
has also been guaranteed by the European 
Communities Act. But if the UK wishes to 
continue participating in the single market 
it will have to guarantee at least to enact 
EU regulations in such a way as to give 
them immediate force in British law (as 
the EEA states already do). That would also 
apply to EU regulations adopted largely 
or entirely without British participation 
during the transition phase. 
Fourthly it would be necessary to define 
effective legal enforcement mechanisms 
for the transition. This raises questions con-
cerning the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice: To what extent do its rul-
ings remain binding on British courts? Can 
the UK be brought before the ECJ if it fails 
to fulfil its legal obligations? Can British 
courts refer legal questions to the ECJ dur-
ing the transition, and if so under what cir-
cumstances? Although Prime Minister May 
has not entirely ruled out a role for the ECJ 
during the transition, the details of any ar-
rangement for jurisprudence, dispute settle-
ment and enforcement of EU rules are likely 
to turn out to be extraordinarily complex. 
In order to satisfy all these requirements, 
the UK would have to at least partially sus-
pend the Withdrawal Bill for the transition 
period and enact instead a “Transition Act” 
equivalent to the European Communities 
Act. In other words, the prime minister 
needs a political majority in both houses of 
parliament for effectively making the UK a 
rule-taker during the transition. In view of 
her dependence on the pro-Brexit DUP for 
her slim majority, and more than forty hard 
Brexiteers in her own parliamentary party, 
it is by no means certain that she could win 
such a vote without the support of the oppo-
sition. If this involves binding the devolved 
administrations of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland to the EU’s legal order – 
as currently provided by the ECA – the mat-
ter could become even more politically 
challenging. 
The UK and the EU Institutions 
Any transitional arrangement will also 
have to clarify the UK’s institutional posi-
tion. Prime Minister May has already an-
nounced that the British will leave the EU’s 
“political” institutions during the transi-
tion. What exactly that is supposed to mean 
remains to be determined. The European 
Council, on the other hand, clarified that 
the UK will no longer “participate in, nomi-
nate or elect members of the EU institutions, 
nor participate in the decision-making of 
the Union bodies, offices or agencies”. 
While that is simply a natural conse-
quence of leaving the EU, it becomes politi-
cally sensitive in any transitional arrange-
ment, especially in relation to policy areas 
where the EU makes distributive decisions. 
In the Common Fisheries Policy for exam-
ple, the EU-27 could adopt quotas disad-
vantaging the UK. For that reason Michael 
Gove, current British secretary of state for 
environment, food and rural affairs and 
a leading figure in the leave campaign, is 
demanding that the UK leave the Fisheries 
Policy during the transition phase. Other 
North Sea fishing nations like Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Ireland are likely to 
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be keen to preserve the EU quotas, assert 
their own fishery interests and insist that 
the UK remains bound by quotas the EU 
will decide without its participation. 
Nor should sight be lost of the difficul-
ties arising in the EU’s second-tier bodies, 
including the comitology committees 
where implementing decisions for EU legal 
acts are agreed. The significance of the com-
mittees, in particular for the functioning 
of the single market, was highlighted by 
the recent controversial glyphosate deci-
sion. European Economic Area members 
are admitted to the committees under Ar-
ticle 100/101 of the EEA Agreement, while 
other third states are not. While the UK 
would be bound by their decisions, the cur-
rent Council guidelines rule out partici-
pation by British representatives. Drawing 
comparisions to the EEA, the UK will have 
grounds to object to that principle. 
There are also doubts concerning the 
UK’s role vis-à-vis the currently thirty-eight 
EU agencies, some of which play crucial 
roles in regulating the single market. Third 
states like Norway are represented in the 
agencies alongside EU member states on a 
case-by-case basis. But they generally have 
no voting rights, even though they are 
bound by the agencies’ decisions, associated 
EU legislation and ECJ judgements. Both for 
the transition and for the future relation-
ship, the UK and the EU-27 will therefore 
have to negotiate UK participation for each 
of the thirty-eight agencies separately. 
Finally, on a general level, the UK’s role 
during the transition period as a taker 
of EU rules it cannot influence raises the 
question of an institutional forum. The UK 
will have legitimate grounds to claim that 
even as a third country, if it is fully bound 
by EU rules, there need to be some institu-
tional forum for information exchange, dis-
pute settlement and coordination.  
EU Citizens and Freedom of Movement 
Another of the EU-27’s conditions for a tran-
sition phase is the preservation of all four 
freedoms of the single market. In the UK 
the question of freedom of movement is 
highly charged: as far as the British govern-
ment is concerned, reducing (labour) migra-
tion from other EU states was a (if not the) 
central motive behind the British leave vote. 
That is why Theresa May initially announced 
in 2016 that freedom of movement would 
end as soon as the UK left the Union. 
In the meantime London has conceded 
that freedom of movement will continue to 
apply in the transition period. EU citizens 
who settle in the UK during this period will 
be required to register, and the system’s 
compatibility with EU law will need to be 
carefully scrutinised. 
The rights of EU citizens within the UK 
are also affected. In the first phase of Brexit 
talks London and Brussels agreed to safe-
guard the rights of all EU citizens living in 
the UK on the date of withdrawal. If free-
dom of movement is retained, however, the 
same question arises for EU citizens enter-
ing the UK during the transition phase. 
Most jobs appointments and university 
courses operate on timeframes longer than 
the planned two-year transition. The EU 
needs to insist that the UK supply legal 
clarification on this point and ensure that 
these citizens are not forced to leave again 
at the end of the transition. The same should 
naturally also apply to British citizens in 
the EU. 
Trade and the Customs Union 
In order to temporarily maintain the status 
quo, special provisions will also be needed 
in relation to external trade policy. After 
leaving the EU the UK will legally become a 
third state like any other, and will no longer 
be covered by trade agreements between 
the EU and other third states such as Cana-
da, South Korea or the EEA. 
This is principally the UK’s problem. 
Most such agreements contain clauses re-
stricting their validity to the territory of the 
EU or of its member states. So in the tran-
sition period the UK will already be seeking 
to adopt the EU’s agreements with third 
states – as quickly as possible and largely 
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unaltered. But to judge by initial discus-
sions, such an outcome is neither guaran-
teed nor without consequences for the EU 
partners. For example, the EU-27 and the 
UK have proposed to the WTO that the EU’s 
existing import quotas be shared between 
the EU-27 and the UK. But partners like the 
United States, Australia and Canada object 
on the grounds that the proposal restricts 
their freedom to redirect exports in line 
with economic developments. Furthermore, 
remaining within the EU’s customs union 
during the transition will limit the UK’s 
ability to strike trade deals with other third 
countries, as it will still be bound by the 
EU’s customs regime at least until transi-
tion ends. 
The economies of the EU-27, however, 
must also reckon with indirect effects. 
Firstly, the UK’s status as a third state also 
changes rules of origin calculations. For 
example, under its free trade agreement 
with the EU, South Korea charges no tariffs 
on imported cars if at least 55 percent of 
their content is produced within the EU. 
After Brexit, car parts produced in the UK 
will no longer count towards the EU share, 
which could then in some cases fall below 
the exemption threshold. 
Secondly, therefore, even if the UK re-
mains in the single market during the tran-
sition customs controls will still be required 
between the UK and the EU-27/EEA to en-
force rules of origin. This will also affect 
border arrangements between Ireland and 
the UK. 
Thirdly, many important free trade 
agreements contain most-favoured-nation 
clauses. Under CETA for example the EU 
must offer Canada any tariff concessions 
it grants to other states in a comparable 
framework. So the EU and the UK cannot 
agree reciprocal exemption from duties 
without granting the same to other third 
states, and thus accruing additional obli-
gations. 
If the EU wishes to preserve the complete 
integrity of the single market, the EU-27 
will have to seek the agreement of the EEA 
and all other affected third states that the 
UK is covered by the respective agreements 
during the transition. That would demand 
considerable political and legal effort, even 
if most third states are likely to be funda-
mentally cooperative. 
New Budget Obligations – Even after the 
“Brexit Bill” 
Furthermore, the status quo can only be 
preserved if financial arrangements are 
kept in place. In the agreement that brought 
the first phase of the negotiations to its 
conclusion, the UK committed to fulfilling 
all the financial obligations it took on as EU 
member state, in particular during the cur-
rent multi-annual financial framework (MFF). 
It should be noted that the current MFF 
expires at the end of 2020. If the transition 
phase extends beyond that, further British 
contributions to the EU budget will be re-
quired. That would complicate the nego-
tiations for the next MFF, in which the UK 
would figure simultaneously as member 
state and future third state. At least for 
the duration of any transition, the EU will 
insist on further financial contributions. In 
comparison, Switzerland and Norway also 
contribute to certain EU funds in propor-
tion to their GDP – without having a vote 
on the EU’s budget planning. Furthermore, 
when the UK leaves it will also lose the 
famous budget rebate that has capped its 
net contribution since 1985. 
The political sensitivity of further finan-
cial demands should not be underestimated. 
May promised that the days of large finan-
cial contributions would be over after Brexit, 
and struggled to secure backing within her 
party and cabinet for the commitments 
already made by the UK. The British would 
feel that the EU was coming straight back 
for more, when they had just agreed to pay 
the EU a figure in the high tens of billions. 
Duration and Extension 
Finally, the duration of the transition regime 
will need to be agreed. British business rep-
resentatives have called for a period of up 
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to five years, as has the Irish foreign minis-
ter; Prime Minister May and Brexit Secre-
tary David Davis speak of about two years. 
The EU-27 have yet to agree on this point. 
The “natural” deadline would be the end 
of the current MFF in December 2020, but 
that leaves a transition of just twenty-one 
months. In view of the experience of the 
Brexit talks thus far, even two years will not 
be enough to conclude a comprehensive 
agreement on future relations between the 
EU and the UK. In addition, a future trade 
deal will most likely be a mixed agreement, 
which requires lengthy ratification across 
all the EU’s national parliaments. 
This immediately poses the question of 
whether the transition period can be ex-
tended. If trade talks run into obstacles the 
EU-27 and/or the British government might 
be interested in acquiring more time, but 
the mere suggestion would provoke howls 
of protest in the UK. But the two-year limit 
on Article 50 has already proved to be a sig-
nificant complicating factor for the Brexit 
negotiations. Any transitional arrangement 
should therefore contain an extension 
option from the outset. 
Alternatives 
Despite fundamental willingness on both 
sides, (rapid) agreement on a transitional 
arrangement is therefore anything but 
certain. The question of alternatives to the 
“status quo” transition outlined above is 
pertinent for both the EU’s negotiators and 
the British government. 
The simplest route in legal terms would 
be to extend the two-year deadline for the 
withdrawal talks. Under Article 50 (3) TEU 
this can be decided at any time without 
legal constraint, by agreement of all mem-
ber states including the UK. The latter would 
remain a normal member of the EU until 
agreement was reached or the agreed ex-
tension expired. But politically neither side 
is currently speaking about such a solution. 
For the EU-27 it would mean the departing 
UK participating in the next European Par-
liament elections in May 2019, keeping its 
seat at the table and right of veto for the 
duration. And the already fragile British 
government would have to abandon its cen-
tral symbolic objective of accomplishing its 
departure by March 2019. But if the UK 
finds itself facing growing economic pres-
sure and/or political turbulence, a request 
to extend the deadline would be conceivable. 
Another option, in the event of failure 
to reach agreement, would be for the UK to 
leave without a transition. Given that the 
transition is being negotiated as part of the 
Article 50 process, this would call into ques-
tion the entire withdrawal agreement. There 
are presently two “no deal” scenarios. One 
would follow the overall collapse of talks 
(“hostile no deal”) without agreement on 
withdrawal, transition or the future rela-
tionship. At the end of the two-year period 
all the EU treaties would cease to apply 
to the UK, without any alternative legal 
arrangements. The currently politically 
agreed divorce settlement would not come 
into force either, negating the UK’s commit-
ment to securing the rights of EU citizens 
and meeting its financial obligations. As well 
as reverting to WTO trade rules, the UK 
would fall out of all the Union’s other regu-
latory arrangements with dramatic conse-
quences for the British economy. The first-
phase agreement, where London made 
significant concessions, has made this sce-
nario considerably less likely. 
The second “no deal” scenario would be 
a pure withdrawal agreement between the 
EU and the UK, including the components 
agreed in the first phase but without Lon-
don agreeing to conditions for the tran-
sition. In this scenario of orderly withdrawal 
trade would also revert to WTO rules, but 
the two sides would at least agree flanking 
measures to avert the worst (for example 
permitting British airlines to continue fly-
ing to the EU). This is technically possible, 
but politically problematic, as the Con-
servative Party in particular would have to 
accept the budget liabilities with no tran-
sition in return. It is also questionable how 
the British-Irish border could be kept fully 
open under this scenario. 
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At least in theory the UK could revoke 
its notification of intention to leave under 
Article 50 and remain a member of the EU. 
Although this option is not explicitly men-
tioned in the treaty, EU leaders like Euro-
pean Council President Donald Tusk have 
always insisted that the door remains open. 
In view of the current state of British poli-
tics, however, the likelihood of such a turn 
of events must be small. Barring a major 
shift in British public opinion, a Brexit 
U-turn would tear even further into the 
Conservative Party and the divided nation. 
Outlook 
A transitional arrangement thus remains 
the best of a range of problematic options 
for both the UK and for the EU-27, despite 
the complexities involved in implementa-
tion. On the basis of the above overview of 
the components required for a transitional 
arrangement that maintains the status quo, 
three central conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, the British government will have 
to deny all the main objectives of the Brexit 
supporters, at least until 2021, if it wishes 
to fulfil the EU-27’s conditions for main-
taining the status quo during a transition 
phase. A status quo transition regime will 
only be viable if the UK anchors the EU’s 
legal framework in UK law for the duration 
of the transition by means of a “Transition 
Act”, including the primacy of EU law, its 
direct effect and jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
This is made more difficult by the May gov-
ernment’s domestic weakness, where she 
will need the support of hard Brexiteers in 
her parliamentary party and in cabinet to 
turn the UK into an (albeit at least time-
limited) rule-taker. Instead of taking back 
control, the UK would in effect cede sover-
eignty to the EU on an unprecedented scale. 
Instead of enjoying voting or even veto 
rights, it will be reduced to accepting and 
implementing EU decisions. This makes 
agreement on such transitional arrange-
ments far from politically certain.  
Secondly, the complexity of the highly 
controversial political negotiations clashes 
with business’s demands for rapid clarifi-
cation. The red lines on both sides and the 
experience to date with the Brexit talks 
suggest that more hard talk is still to come 
– not just between Brussels and London, 
but between different sides in London. But 
it is not just the UK that will have to make 
tough choices over the shape of the tran-
sition. The EU-27 will also face difficult 
questions, for example concerning the UK’s 
role in the EU institutions, further post-
2020 financial obligations, and the role of 
the ECJ. The extent to which the EU’s free 
trade agreements apply to the post-Brexit 
UK will also have to be clarified with third 
states. 
Thirdly, the transition phase will not 
form a bridge to a predefined future rela-
tionship between the EU and the UK. It will 
merely be a means to keep the UK within 
the EU’s legal framework for a little longer 
in order to negotiate the future relation-
ship. March 2019 is an unrealistic deadline 
for a comprehensive agreement, even a two-
year transition phase is ambitious. The tran-
sition is not a side-show; it will shape the 
relationship between the United Kingdom 
and Europe for years to come. 
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